THE FOCUSED ATTENTION OF OTHERS:
A CONCEPTUAL AND NORMATIVE MODEL OF
PERSONAL AND LEGAL PRIVACY
I. The Right to Be Let Alone
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.1
Justice Brandeis saw the Constitution as conferring a substantive right
that is both the most comprehensive, and most the most valued, of any in the
document.

What is this remarkable right?

In the narrow context of United

States v. Olmstead, it appears to be the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable search or seizure.

But Brandeis made a very similar

argument in many of the same words thirty years earlier in a very famous and
influential law journal article.2 In this earlier context the right is specifically
identified as the right to privacy. In both the law journal, where the focus was
on the development of civil protection of privacy, and the constitutional case
dealing with the Fourth Amendment, Brandeis characterized privacy in Judge
Cooley’s terms - the right to be let alone. What do we mean by a right to be let
alone?
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Except for a few very eccentric, and sometimes dangerous, individuals, no
one desires to be let entirely alone. Humans need friends, family, and social
interaction. Life, liberty, property, and happiness all depend on deeply complex
social, commercial, legal, and moral interactions. A culture, and this is probably
an oxymoron, of hermits and recluses is the last thing civilized men or women
would desire. But, of course, Justice Brandeis knew this all along. The right to
be let alone was never imagined to be a normative directive to let individuals
totally alone. It articulates a value in letting people alone, in certain kinds of
ways, and in limited contexts. Exactly what these kinds of ways that people are
entitled to be let alone are, or what precisely the contexts in which this
entitlement holds, are the subject of great moral, legal, and constitutional
controversy.
In addition to his provocative identification of privacy with an entitlement
to be let alone, Justice Brandeis makes a comparative assertion. Not only is an
individual’s interest in personal and constitutional privacy identified as a right, it
is given pride of place as the most comprehensive and valued of rights. This
seems unlikely; privacy is not, nor has it ever been, the most valued of possible
rights. Most citizens, sad to say, don’t think enough about moral or legal rights
to have an opinion one way or another. Those who do are as likely to identify
the Second Amendment, or a collective community right to law and order, as the
most valuable. Even as thoughtful and distinguished a jurist as Justice Black
expresses an almost dismissive evaluation of the importance of privacy.
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The Court talks about a constitutional “right of
privacy” as though there is some constitutional
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be
passed which might abridge the “privacy” of
individuals. But there is not. . . . I like my privacy
as well as the next one, but I am compelled to admit
that government has a right to invade it unless
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.3
Justice Brandeis’ concerns were not empirical, nor ethnographic.
extraordinary claim is a normative one.

His

Privacy is a central, and perhaps

essential, value in a genuinely liberal society. I think he is quite correct in this
judgment.

This remains bitterly controversial, however, not just because all

normative and academic theses are controversial, but because we have such a
fragile and imperfect understanding of the nature of personal and legal privacy,
and an equally unclear vision of its social, legal, and moral importance.

An

entitlement to be let alone is an intriguing normative directive in a liberal society,
but one that raises as many questions as it answers. In what sense are citizens
entitled to be let alone? And by whom? And in what contexts? An adequate
theory of privacy must provide at least the bare outlines to these basic
questions. Further, assuming we can reach some consensus about the nature of
privacy, there remain difficult questions about the sacrifices society can be
expected to make in order to respect individual privacy.

Honoring personal

privacy exacts a very real social cost. How can we ever engage in the reflective
balancing of the costs and benefits of protecting privacy when we have such a
sketchy understanding of its place in the larger array of values and rights in
contemporary liberal society?
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My hope in the discussion to follow is at the same time unrealistically
ambitious, and cautiously modest.

The modesty comes from the fact that I

advocate no significant legal or conceptual change, and because, though I have
strong feelings, which I make no special attempt to disguise, on the substantive
moral, legal, and constitutional questions which surround privacy, I in no way
see my own substantive views as any kind of logical outgrowth of my analysis.
The ambition comes from the conceit of offering yet another model or analysis of
personal and legal privacy.

Over forty years ago, Judge Biggs colorfully

described the privacy literature as “a haystack in a hurricane.”4 The ensuing
decades have seen a profusion of scholarly attention, and many new competing
definitions, but nothing remotely resembling consensus.

I put forward an

analysis of privacy here that is “mine” only in the sense that I take the credit and
blame for the particular articulation and argumentative defense before you. I
believe that it is implicit, and sometimes explicit, in the work of a number of
scholars. I am confident that it is conceptually superior to competing models,
but I have no illusions that it possesses some kind of magical analytic clarity that
will immediately win over advocates for rival understandings of privacy. My hope
is that the community of scholars toiling in the fields of privacy will find some use
for a somewhat systematic examination of recent developments, and for a
concrete proposal for consideration and review.
II. Semantic Legislation
Defining privacy requires a familiarity with its ordinary
usage, of course, but this is not enough since our
common ways of talking and using language are
4

riddled with inconsistencies, ambiguities, and
paradoxes. What we need is a definition which is by
and large consistent with ordinary language, so that
capable speakers of English will not be genuinely
surprised that the term “privacy” should be defined in
this way, but which also enables us to talk
consistently, clearly, and precisely about the family of
concepts to which privacy belongs.5
Since its very beginnings as a written discipline, philosophy has seen itself
as fundamentally concerned with the analysis of thought and language. This
often leads to the caricature that philosophers only care about words. Not true,
of course. We want to understand the nature of a concept like privacy, not
because we want to compile new dictionary entries, but because we care about
privacy, and laws and public policies that may enhance or threaten our privacy.
But, some better understanding of privacy seems required for an informed and
productive debate about those laws and public policies. And it is hard to see
how such conceptual improvement could come about without careful scholarly
attention by philosophers, social scientists, and academic lawyers.
Natural language is at times vague, ambiguous, and unclear. Speakers
misuse language. Occasionally what appears to be a substantive dispute turns
out to nothing more than a simple linguistic misunderstanding.

It is hardly

surprising, therefore, that scholars professionally trained to pay attention to
language grow impatient and advocate linguistic reform and greater linguistic
care. The concept of privacy seems a natural for this sort of conceptual revision.
W. A. Parent in the quote above is unapologetic in his call for a more precise
definition of privacy.
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Let us assume that Professor Parent’s call for linguistic reform is more
than a rhetorical voice. He is concerned, as are many privacy scholars, with
rampant inconsistency, ambiguity, and paradox, in the colloquial and legal usage
of the concept of privacy.

He proposes, therefore, a reformed definition of

privacy that eliminates contradictory wordings, and resolves vague and
ambiguous usages into clear and precise ones. I am convinced that this sort of
semantic legislation, no matter how well intentioned or easily sympathized with,
is a futile philosophical undertaking.

There is clear value, of course, in

scrupulously calling attention to ambiguity, vagueness, and contradiction.

If

privacy is guilty of these conceptual sins (and I suspect most every interesting
concept is to some degree), then there is an analytic obligation to point them
out, and perhaps even to suggest ways of dealing with the problems. But taking
language that is widely used in inconsistent or ambiguous ways, or worrying
about concepts that admit of borderline cases, and artificially redefining them by
mandating a new, consistent, univocal, and precise usage is a waste of
philosophical time and effort.
Linguistic usage is certainly malleable.

But conceptual change is the

product of generations of gradually evolving linguistic habits, not an abrupt,
overnight cessation of old ways of thinking and speaking, and the adoption of
new philosophically mandated ones to replace them. I claim as a simple matter
of empirical fact that such immediate linguistic change is psychologically and
anthropologically impossible. This fact, alone, has to raise serious doubts about

6

the whole approach of semantic legislation as a way of understanding
philosophical analysis.
Perhaps even more problematic for this perspective, however, is that
semantic legislation would typically prove to be normatively futile. The problem
here is that philosophical analysis of normative concepts like privacy rarely takes
place independently of larger political and moral questions. Definitions of privacy
are often used as premises in arguments for social and legal policies. And the
debates about these policies are always contentious.

Any recommended

conceptual “improvement” will be readily embraced by partisans whose position
will enhanced by the proposed semantic legislation. But those on the opposite
side, if they have their wits about them, will reject the proposal as not being an
improvement at all, but rather as begging-the-question against them.

The

existing substantive debate will find itself recast as a conceptual disagreement.
And this is to be despaired, not simply because it will prove to be every bit as
controversial as the original policy dispute, but also because it actually mischaracterizes the real nature of the fight, and thus makes it even less likely that
the opposing positions can find room for compromise, let alone resolution.
III. Information Models of Privacy
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.6
A. Privacy and Information
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In a literature that is often characterized as a complete absence of scholarly
consensus, one finds surprising agreement concerning the centrality of
information to the concept of personal privacy.

Although there is an initial

plausibility to the claim that epistemological concepts like information, data, and
knowledge form the analytic core of privacy, I contend that privacy should be
understood in a very different fashion. One part of my argument will be to show
that there are many standard uses of privacy where informational concerns are
either completely absent, or can only be included in artificial and contrived ways.
I will concede that there are many other instances, however, where information
does seem to be center stage.

My strategy, here, will be to suggest that

although in these latter cases information and privacy are connected, the linkage
is contingent, and neither analytically nor normatively central.
The following is an example of a recent theory of privacy that received some
scholarly attention in the 1980s. I intend to be brutally harsh on it, but I must
confess at the outset that it has great initial plausibility, and certainly possesses
the theoretical virtues of clarity and elegance. Nevertheless, I believe it can be
shown to be conclusively false. Perhaps falsity is an inappropriate charge, since
Parent is candidly involved in semantic legislation. Still, since he admits desiring
a theory that is “by and large consistent with ordinary language,” and one that
“enables us to talk clearly and precisely about the family of concepts to which
privacy belongs,”7 I think it is fair to submit the theory to the challenge of
potential counter-examples.
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Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented
personal knowledge of one possessed by others. A
person’s privacy is diminished exactly to the degree
that others possess this kind of knowledge about him.
. . . [P]ersonal information . . . [should] be
understood to consist of facts about a person which
most individuals in a given society do not want widely
known about themselves.8
As admirably clear as this model first appears, there are at least four
components that demand further clarification.

Parent uses the concepts of

knowledge and information as virtually synonymous. In colloquial speech this
reasonable enough, but in most philosophical contexts there are distinctions that
deserve at least some mention.

Information, or facts, are impersonal, and

although the data exists, it is quite possible that no one is aware of if. I may
“possess” a good deal of information about climate conditions in South America
by owning a handy-dandy computer encyclopedia, though I never consult the
relevant entries. The F.B.I. may possess a good deal of data about you in one of
their seldom accessed files.

Knowledge, however, is a much more dynamic

epistemological concept. According to what is sometimes called the standard
analysis, to know something is to believe it, and to have good evidence for it,
and for it to be true. For Parent, as well as many of the information models, it is
unclear whether information or knowledge is the real concern. Has the F.B.I.
violated your privacy if it has all the data about you, but never accesses it? Not
even the clerks who enter it? Every one of us, even the most radical privacy
hawks, would care more if the inappropriate personal data was known –
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believed, thought about, considered, etc. – by others, than if it was just
mechanically compiled. This should alert us to something important, I believe.
Obviously not any old question about you or your person counts as

personal.

Privacy, according to Parent, protects personal information.

His

working definition of personal information is a helpful blend of example and
generalized conceptual description.
In contemporary America facts about a person’s
sexual preferences, drinking or drug habits, income,
the state of his or her marriage and health belong to
the class of personal information. Ten years from
now some of these facts may be a part of everyday
conversation; if so their disclosure would not diminish
individual privacy. [P]ersonal information . . . [is] a
function of existing cultural norms and social
practices.9
So far, so good.

But then comes a surprising addition to the category of

personal information.

One that at first just seems eccentric, but I believe is

symptomatic of a more serious conceptual malady.
[We must] accommodate a particular and unusual
class of cases of the following sort. Most of us don’t
care if our height, say, is widely known. But there
are a few persons who are extremely sensitive about
their height (or weight or voice pitch). They might
take extreme measures to ensure that other people
do not find it out. For such individuals height is a
very personal matter. Were someone to find it out by
ingenious snooping we should not hesitate to talk
about an invasion of privacy.10
I think we would, indeed, describe this example as an invasion of privacy, but
not because the information has idiosyncratically become personal, but rather
because there has been ingenious, and we assume inappropriate, snooping.
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Once again we have advance warning that something besides information is at
work in our concerns with personal privacy.
Finally we come to the last, and least plausible, part of Parent’s model. As
with most aspects of this analysis, there is complete candor and philosophical
purpose to its inclusion.
My definition of privacy excludes knowledge of
documented personal information. I do this for a
simple reason. Suppose that A is browsing through
some old newspapers and happens to see B’s name in
a story about child prodigies who unaccountably
failed to succeed as adults. Should we accuse A of
invading B’s privacy? No. An affirmative answer
blurs the distinction between the public and the
private. What belongs to the public domain cannot
without glaring paradox be called private;
consequently it should not be incorporated within our
concept of privacy.11
I confess here to a simple intuitive disagreement. I believe that the adolescent
games engaged in by Bill and Monica were none of our business. I think that
their inclusion in the Special Prosecutor’s report was a violation of privacy. Grant
me the above, as they say, for the sake of argument. Doesn’t it continue to
violate their privacy every time their behavior is referred to again in the tabloids,
or the evening news, or in monologues on late-night TV? Parent’s category of
undocumented personal information seems to put a kind of statute of limitations
on violations of privacy. I surreptitiously take a digital photo of you and your
mistress. I take it that we are agreed I have violated your privacy. I post it on
my webpage, I have further violated your privacy. Is the picture now fair game?
Is it permissible, now, for others to forward it indiscriminately.
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Maybe my

webpage is obscure and rarely accessed, but Smith’s is prestigious and
everybody clicks in. Doesn’t Smith further violate your privacy, perhaps even
more seriously than I did, when she uploads the photo onto hers? The issues
raised here are more subtle than the simple dismissal that “what belongs to the
public domain cannot without glaring paradox be called private.”
Most introductory logic books contain ordinary language paraphrases for
the sentential connectives in the first-order propositional calculus.

The

relationship of biconditionality that we typically see in the classical form of
conceptual analysis is indicated in colloquial speech by the phrases “if and only
if,” or “just in case.” I know of no intro book that includes the phrase “exactly to
the degree that.” I am assuming, nevertheless, that Parent intends this strong
logical connection. His model of personal privacy, then, can be reconstructed as
follows.
A’s privacy is violated by B iff:
•

B possesses personal knowledge (or information) about A (without
A’s consent).

•

The personal knowledge about A is undocumented.

This model possesses many conceptual virtues - relative clarity, simplicity, and
perhaps even initial plausibility. Its biggest vice, unfortunately, that it seriously
mischaracterizes the nature and importance of personal privacy. I will use the
method of counter-examples to make my case.
B. Three Kinds of Counter-Examples
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I will be presenting three distinct sorts of counter-examples to Parent’s
model of personal privacy. Any one of these would be adequate for the narrow
task of demonstrating the model’s inadequacy, of course, but it is interesting to
see the different ways it fails to capture some of our deepest feelings about
privacy.

My ultimate goal is to suggest that these categories of counter-

examples pose profound explanatory hurdles for any type of information based
analysis of privacy. And may even prove useful in pointing the way to more
plausible accounts of the concept.
The first class of cases involve failed attempts to uncover information,
including undocumented personal information. You and I are both candidates
for the department chair. You suspect that I engage in unprofessional conduct
with female students in the privacy of my office, and that by documenting it to
the Dean you can sabotage my candidacy. You bribe the custodian, gain access
to my office late one night, and install hidden microphones and video cameras.
Bad luck for you. In the two weeks you monitor my office I contract the flu, and
never make it into work. The job is announced, neither of us gets it, and you
remove the equipment before I recover and return to school.

According to

Parent’s model, you do not violate my privacy by your actions. After all, you
clearly do not possess undocumented personal information about me. You do
know that I haven’t been into work, but that information is not personal, and is
well-documented with all of our colleagues. You possess data about how messy
my office is, but again, that’s not particularly personal, and is so welldocumented within the campus community that I am famous for my untidy
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ways. Have you perhaps simply attempted to violate my privacy, but failed?
Your devious plan is certainly a spectacular failure, but you have succeeded,
beautifully, in violating my privacy. It would be way too easy on you to allow
you to plead to the lesser moral charge of merely attempting to violate my
privacy. I know of no way of establishing this clear intuition on my part other
than asking you to imagine yourself as the victim. Isn’t your outrage, supposing
that you somehow find out about the surveillance, that of someone who has
actually been harmed, not that of someone who has luckily avoided it?
The second class of counter-examples seeks to even more drastically
sever the connection between privacy and information. You are my research
assistant. I believe that you have great academic promise, and I also presume
to know you well enough to make judgments about your future happiness. You
tell me of your plans to delay your dissertation and get married. I’m convinced
the guy’s a loser, and that you will be terribly unhappy; I’m also devastated that
you would potentially abandon such bright academic prospects. Though many
might disagree, I do not believe that it would be a violation of your privacy for
me to share my misgivings with you as a friend and mentor. But suppose I just
can’t let go of it. I continually lecture you on what a mistake you are about to
make, how you are throwing away your future, and how miserable you will be.
Surely, now, I have intruded on things that are “none of my business.”
I am convinced that this is a very central case of violating someone’s
privacy. Focus on knowledge or information, however, seems to completely miss
the normative point. It is true, of course, that you could have protected yourself
14

from my meddling by keeping your plans secret. There is what we might call an
empirical link between personal privacy and blocks on information and
knowledge in many cases like the above. If you hide your plans from me, keep
them secret, treat them as confidential, you will no doubt spare yourself from my
butting in. But the violation of your privacy is not what I know, or data that I
have come to possess.

It is what I do.

I violate your privacy by being a

presumptuous busybody.
The last class of counter-examples explores the delicate topics of sexuality
and nudity.

More than one privacy scholar has commented on the archaic

sounding expression “private parts” as a euphuism for genitals.

Our bodies,

particularly in states of undress, as well as our sex lives, are preeminent areas of
personal privacy. Yet, information models totally miss the point of the privacy
concerns associated with sexuality, excretion, and nudity.

Consider two nice

examples from the recent literature. First from Julie Inness.
[W]hen a peeping Tom looks in a person’s window for
the second time, it is conceivable that he might
acquire absolutely no new information about the
victim. Despite this failure, the peeping Tom clearly
violates the victim’s privacy with the second, as well
as the first, inspection. When he is charged with the
second violation, he cannot escape with the
explanation, “I’ve seen it all before!”12
And a second from Judith DeCew.
Consider a man who knows his wife’s body very well
but is now divorced from her and spying on her as
she takes a bath. It is difficult to deny that her
privacy is being invaded.13
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The power of these little counter-examples seems to derive from the fact
that “knowledge” of the appearance of the victim’s body is in some sense
“documented.” And since Parent’s analysis explicitly includes the condition that
the “information” be undocumented, they constitute profound, and I would
argue, fatal, problems for the model. I would go further, however. What about
Inness’s voyeur on his first visit to his victim’s window? Surely he has violated
her privacy. Has he gained undocumented personal information? Perhaps, but I
suggest that any information or knowledge is completely incidental to the
offense, and that it totally misrepresents the victim’s concern. She cares that the
privacy of her home has been compromised, and that she has been stared at in a
state of undress, and not that something secret or confidential has been
discovered.

Thus, I am pressing the point that cases of voyeurism count as

serious counter-examples to Parent’s analysis quite independently of the number
of times one has been victimized.
C. More Modest Information Models of Privacy
An attack on a very specific conceptual model can be a cowardly strategy.
So what if the precise formulation suggested by Parent can be shown to be
inadequate?

The philosophical critic earns some small analytical points by

systematically marshaling her counter examples, but does this in anyway show
that the initial intuition is conceptually flawed? Many scholars, perhaps even a
majority of them, have seen something analytically central between the concepts
of information and privacy. The more interesting analyses attempt to articulate
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this connection in more modest and plausible forms. Consider, for example, the
following from Richard Wasserstrom.
It is apparent that there are a number of different
claims that can be made in the name of privacy. A
number - and perhaps all - of them involve the
question of the kind and degree of control that a
person ought to be able to exercise in respect to
knowledge or the disclosure of information about
himself or herself. That is not all there is to privacy,
but it is surely one central theme.14
Is information even analytically central to the concept of privacy? If the
literature is to be trusted, the consensus must be an unqualified yes. And to the
degree that the intuitions of casual speakers are relevant, the answer is again in
the affirmative.

Perhaps, therefore, it is nothing more than an exercise in

semantic legislation to quarrel with such widespread agreement. Still, I see no
escape from the fact that the analysis so far shows that there remain central
cases of gross violations of privacy that have little or nothing to do with
information.
This is clearest in cases like the overbearing mentor.

The research

assistant’s decisions about marriage, her education, and perhaps her career are
none of his business.

His initial advice may have been appropriate, but his

incessant lecturing is clearly wrong.

The normative breach in these kinds of

cases has nothing to do with knowledge, but with attempts to influence certain
kinds of decisions and behavior.

These sorts of intrusions into people’s lives

constitute a very serious violation of personal privacy.
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Very similar considerations explain why we so naturally describe formal
actions on the part of institutions and government that restrict choice as
violations of privacy. When the law presumes to restrict the use of contraceptive
devices it intrudes on individuals’ privacy.
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to
bear or beget a child.15
We have already seen that information is related to these sorts of privacy
violations in a contingent manner.

If the research assistant keeps her plans

secret, she effectively blocks the intrusion from her mentor.

If single and

married individuals only clandestinely obtain and use birth control devices, they
have little to fear from government.

But even this concedes too much to

information analyses. Why should the graduate student have to keep her plans
secret? Indeed, she wanted to share the exciting news with her mentor. The
Connecticut and Massachusetts laws in Griswold and Eisenstadt make this point
even more directly. Why should married or single individuals have to take any
risk of being caught, or suffer the inconvenience of the black market to secure
their contraceptives? Government has no business in this aspect of a person’s
life.
I have already argued that the very complex, and clearly socially
constructed, conventions regarding sexuality, nudity, and the like cannot be
adequately captured by the concepts of information and knowledge.

Any

temptation to treat these issues in informational terms simply places an
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unrealistic emphasis on the sensory nature of the violation.

It is true that

sensory modalities are our primary, if not only, means of acquiring information.
It is equally true that the voyeur, or the pervert who listens in as you and your
lover engage in sex, depends upon his senses for his cheap thrills. But the goal
of the watching or listening is not informational, and the offense felt by the
victims has nothing to do with any potential knowledge that might be
illegitimately gained.
The force of these examples is very different than when they were first
applied to Parent. The modest approach is not committed to information being
logically necessary, nor sufficient, for the concept privacy.

The counter

examples, therefore, do not refute the model. They do pose, however, what I
have called explanatory hurdles.

Information is hypothesized as a central,

indeed the central, analytic component in privacy. Yet there are at least two
sorts of standard privacy violations that have little, if anything, to do with
knowledge or information. This has to give at least some pause for thought.
C. Information and the Judgment of Others
Perhaps the virtues of information models can only truly be appreciated by
focusing on the admittedly numerous cases where privacy and the control of
personal information does seem center stage. Let us turn our attention to some
instances of privacy that seem to intrinsically involve epistemological concepts of
knowledge and information. Most of us in this culture consider facts and data
about the following aspects of our lives very personal and private.
•

Our health and medical records
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•

Our finances

•

Lifestyle choices such as our use of drugs and alcohol

•

Details about our closest personal relationships

•

Almost any occurrences within the “privacy” of our homes

•

Creative endeavors like poetry or painting

We may, of course, voluntarily chose to share this personal information with
others - the finance company when we apply for a loan, guests invited into our
homes, or our paintings when they are displayed at the county fair. But the
choice is ours; we are entitled to block others from having this knowledge about
us, and to feel profound moral and legal outrage when they illegitimately come
to possess it.
It is indeed natural to describe the privacy concerns above in
informational terms.

I have been arguing for two decades, however, that

information and knowledge is not our “real” concern.16 To take a couple of
examples from the little laundry list above - I desire to shelter information about
my drinking, lest you consider me a drunk; my poetry is confidential, since I
have no desire to be laughed at. My general thesis has been that there is an
obvious empirical connection between information and judgment. On the basis
of personal information (both reliable and unreliable) others may form judgments
about us.

Perhaps the most effective way of ensuring that others not

illegitimately judge us is to block their access to personal information. Thus, I
claim, in a world where individuals were truly granted a limited and culturally
defined immunity from the judgment of others, we would have little, if any,
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concern about others possessing information about us within this limited sphere
of our lives.
The immunity from the judgment of others hypothesis nicely captures our
privacy concerns with respect to government. The Fourth Amendment grants us
immunity from the judgment of the state with respect to our persons, houses,
papers, and effects. Rather than warrants and probable cause providing shields
that allow for criminal activity, the Fourth Amendment protects the innocent,
honorable, and law-abiding. We are all granted immunity from government’s
moral and legal judgment within these most private aspects of our personal
environment. In addition, we are granted immunity from judgment with respect
to certain personal decisions and actions.

It was none of the overbearing

mentor’s business what his research assistant decided to do with her life. Recent
constitutional law has similarly recognized that it is none of government’s
business what citizens decide to do with respect to birth control, unwanted
pregnancies, or consensual adult sexual encounters. Many of us believe, though
the Supreme Court has yet to agree, that it is none of government’s business
what the gender of citizens desiring to marry is, or choices to end one’s life in
the face of medical considerations.

Here it is very clear, I believe, that our

privacy concerns are not with government having knowledge that we have
secured an abortion, are seeking homosexual marriage, or exercised our right to
die, but that we insist that government not judge us, that it not criminalize or
prohibit these personal choices and behavior.
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The judgment of others hypothesis has the advantage of changing the
focus from the passive epistemological states of others, to the much more active
affective cognitive states of others.

Most of us immediately recognize how

discomforting it can be to be judged by others in those limited contexts where
we expect immunity. I remain confident, therefore, that the immunity from the
judgment of others account is explanatorily superior to information models in
many contexts. I think it does a much better job of uncovering the source of our
own reactions to violations of our privacy.
Unfortunately, many of the examples I have brought to bear against
information models apply with almost equal force to the immunity from the
judgment of others approach. There is nothing intrinsically judgmental about
voyeurism, for example.

And, in fact, much of what we might call casual

snooping can be done from a non-judgmental perspective - maybe I’m just
curious about how much money you make. The move to the affective attitudes
of others, rather than the passive state of their knowledge, remains a useful
insight into the analytic core of personal privacy. But when all is said and done,
immunity from the judgment of others only captures a part of the concept of
privacy, and it seems worthwhile to continue the quest for a more all-inclusive
analysis.
IV. Cluster Theories of Privacy
The right to privacy is another example. We value
privacy; and what we think of as the right to privacy
is a cluster of rights that protect it. But here it seems
to me there is much slithering in the literature: not
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only is the scope of this right unclear, it is unclear
what is even at the heart of it.
But there are no sharp boundaries around any
of the cluster-rights, even those much clearer than is
that of the right to privacy.17
A. The Diversity of Privacy
The concept of personal privacy encompasses a daunting array of cases.
Most of us expect some protection from the following sorts of invasions.
•

Having our offices or homes monitored .

•

The spying of peeping-Toms

•

Having our medical or financial records perused by others.

•

Having personal information published in the tabloids.

•

Having well-meaning, but overbearing, mentors lecture us on career or
marriage.

•

Unreasonable searches by the police.

•

“[U]nwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the right to bear or beget a child.”18

Much of the privacy literature assumes some core notion that unites this wide
collection of moral, legal, and constitutional concerns. But, perhaps, we are not
dealing with a single concept, or right, at all, but a complex amalgamation of
legal and moral immunities misleadingly assembled under a single rubric.
This hypothesis has two immediate theoretical advantages. It offers a
very straightforward account of the past one hundred years of privacy
scholarship. No wonder the literature is in such disarray. It would be like trying
to offer a definition of the concept of a bank that simultaneously included
financial institutions, sides of rivers, and elevated turns in the roadway.
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Furthermore, if the philosopher or academic lawyer is freed from the
responsibility of offering all-inclusive analyses, perhaps genuine headway can be
made concerning concrete issues like, the confidentiality of medical records, or a
better understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be
reasonable. Although the case for abandoning the search for a unified analysis
of personal privacy is potentially strong, the traditional goal of articulating an allencompassing model of such an important moral and legal notion also seems
worth pursuing.

We must, therefore, briefly examine a couple of recent

arguments for abandoning the traditional approach.
B. Thomson’s Derivative Theory
According to Judith Jarvis Thomson the only clarity in the privacy
literature is its unclarity.
Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to
privacy is that nobody seems to have a very clear
idea what it is.19
She then goes on to offer a very concrete diagnosis of why there has
been such widespread confusion. Indeed, she suggests three related sources of
our analytical befuddlement. First is our fragile understanding of the concept of
privacy. Second, and equally important, are the pervasive misunderstandings
concerning rights, in general. And, third, the hypothesis that we are not really
dealing with a univocal concept at all when we worry about the right to privacy.
It begins to suggest itself, then, as a simplifying
hypothesis, that the right to privacy is itself a cluster
of rights, and that it is not a distinct cluster of rights
but itself intersects with the cluster of rights which
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the right over the person consists in and also with the
cluster of rights which owning property consists in.20
Professor Thomson is well-known among professional philosophers for the
grace of her prose, and particularly, for her inspired use of thought-experiments
as rhetorical devices for arguing a conceptual case. She begins with a good one.
She and her husband are having a fight that is very loud and they have
carelessly left the windows open. I stop to listen. This is not very nice of me,
perhaps it is even morally wrong, but I do not violate their rights. In contrast
she asks us to consider a slightly different scenario. She and her husband are
again fighting, but much quieter, and with the windows closed. You listen to
them by training an amplifier on the house. You have violated their right to
privacy.

Thomson sees the normative difference between these cases as a

conceptual datum, a starting point for discussion. I’m not completely convinced,
but let’s grant her point. By her own account we are not really discussing the
nature of personal privacy, but what is involved in having a (moral) right - in this
case the right to privacy. These are very different issues. Thomson implicitly
concedes that both examples potentially concern privacy, why else explicitly
contrast them?

She further concedes that normative conventions cover both

cases. Suppose she is right that I do not violate anyone’s rights by listening to
the louder fight. I can’t be arrested or sued, for example. I still may intrude on
her and husband’s privacy. Indeed, I will be arguing that is precisely why what I
have done is not very nice, and probably wrong.
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Her account of why the second case of listening to the fight is a violation
of the right to privacy, and the first case is at worst an intrusion upon privacy,
depends on an analogy with personal property - in her delightful example, a
particularly great pornographic picture.

As with anything you own, you have

certain concrete rights that derive from the general right to property. Thus, you
have a right that your pornographic picture not be taken from you, damaged, or
even looked at by others without your permission - though if your “picture is
good pornography, it would be pretty mingy of [you] to keep it permanently
hidden so that nobody but [you] shall ever see it - a nicer person would let his
friends have a look too.”21 If I tear your picture up, I violate an “ungrand” right
of yours not to have your pornographic pictures destroyed; one that derives from
your right to property. If I train my long distance X-ray device on your wall safe
where you keep the picture squirreled away, I violate your “ungrand” right not to
have your porn looked at by others. We describe this latter case as deriving
from your right to privacy, but Thomson claims its source is really the right to
property.
Thomson argues that we also possess a general right “over our own
person.” Your specific rights over your left knee, to again poach one of her
examples, is not exactly a property right - you didn’t buy it, though you could sell
it except for the problem of, “who’d buy a used left knee?”22 This “grand” right
leads to several specific “ungrand” rights - the right not to have your left knee
damaged, or stroked, or if you’re shy, even looked at.

When it comes to

immunity from having your knee damaged, this ungrand right derives from your
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right over your own person. According to Thomson, in the case of the knee
being looked at, and perhaps simply touched, as well, we are tempted to derive
the protection from the right to privacy, but it just as likely comes from this
general right over our own person.
Now rights to both property, and over one’s person, are not inalienable;
they can be waived, sold, given away, or carelessly non-enforced. You do not
violate my right to property if you take home the pornographic photograph that I
carelessly left on the bus, neither do you violate my right to property (and
perhaps privacy) if you simply look at it there on the bus seat. Similarly with the
left knee, if you carelessly leave it exposed for all the world to see, we violate no
right of yours - neither over your person, nor a right of privacy - if we all take a
good look. This is the crux of her argument about listening to the fight between
her and her husband. By leaving the window open and screaming at the top of
their lungs, they have carelessly given away, or at least not take proper steps to
protect their right to privacy.
All of this is merely sets the stage for the derivative thesis. Thomson
correctly sees that merely re-describing situations involving the right to privacy in
language that doesn’t use the concept, or even in terms of differing normative
entitlements, does not establish the thesis that there is no distinct right to
privacy.
The fact, supposing it is a fact, that every right in the
right-to-privacy cluster is also in some other rights
cluster does not by itself show that the right to
privacy is in any plausible sense a “derivative” right.
A more important point seems to me to be this: the
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fact that we have a right to privacy does not explain
our having any of the rights in the right to privacy
cluster. . . . I have a right that my pornographic
picture not be torn. Why? Because it’s mine,
because I own it. . . . But I don’t have a right not
to be looked at because I have a right to privacy; I
don’t have a right that no one shall torture me in
order to get personal information about me because I
have a right to privacy; one is inclined, rather, to say
that it is because I have these rights that I have a
right to privacy.23
There are a number of rights that I possess that I would have naively
taken to be explained by a more general right to privacy.

These include, at

least, the following.
•

I have a right not to be looked at (in certain culturally
defined contexts).

•

I have a right not to have personal information about me
published.

•

I have a right not to be unreasonably searched.

•

I have a right not to have fundamentally important decisions
interfered with.

Why? According to the derivative hypothesis this is not because of any general
right to privacy - that’s an illusion. Rather, if a right to privacy exists at all, it is
because of these, and other equally specific, rights.
Couldn’t an argument of the same form be constructed for any general
right? Consider some specific property rights.
•

I have a right that my car not be “borrowed” without my
permission.

•

I have a right that my articles on privacy not be copied.
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•

I have a right that my acreage in the woods not be trespassed
upon.

•

I have a right to will my patent on my invention to my nephew.

•

I have a right to sell my used left knee.

Suppose a derivative theorist of property were to claim that no general right to
property explains the specific rights, but rather it is the specific rights that give
us the general right to property. In one sense, this is exactly right. General
concepts in the law usually come from specific cases.

But, it also seems

genuinely explanatory to account for these specific rights in terms of a general
right to property.
This is exactly the response I want to give to the derivative account of the
right to privacy. In one helpful sense, the general right to privacy does derive
from specific cases.

But that does not mean that it is unhelpful, or non-

explanatory, to account for those very same specific cases by appealing to a
general right to privacy.

Particularly, if some unified theory of the abstract

nature of privacy is forthcoming. The fallacy here is to assume that conceptual
explanation can only work in one direction.

Such a view of explanation is

plausible in the case of causal accounts, but much less plausible in moral
philosophy or jurisprudence.
Thomson’s argument, after all, is not about privacy, but about the right to
privacy. It is easy enough, however, to imagine what a derivative theory of the
nature of privacy would look like. No one has a clear idea of what privacy is.
The only thing that unites different examples of privacy is that we use the term,
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“privacy,” to describe them. This, of course, is possible, but I think extremely
implausible.

Privacy scholars have found it extremely difficult to articulate a

simple elegant theory of the nature of privacy - that’s almost a truism. But, it
hardly follows that there is nothing other than our use of the concept that unifies
the varied privacy concerns. I remain optimistic that there is, indeed, something
that brings together the different moral, legal, and constitutional concerns that
we use the language of privacy to characterize.
C. DeCew’s Multifacited Model of Privacy
Judith DeCew’s very interesting and useful analysis of privacy candidly
attempts to split the difference between the derivative approach championed by
Thomson, and the narrow “unitary” approach favored by Parent.

Almost

everyone who has reflected on personal and legal privacy has been struck with
how varied its uses are in moral and legal contexts. At the same time, we do
find the use of a single concept linguistically natural. An approach to privacy
that acknowledges both of these conceptual data has a lot of initial plausibility.
We have seen that it is not possible to give a unique,
unitary definition of privacy that covers all the diverse
privacy interests. The other extreme - abandoning
the notion of privacy as meaningless or completely
derivative from other interests such as property or
bodily security - is equally untenable. My approach,
therefore, is to take a middle course. . . . I defend
privacy as a broad and multifaceted cluster concept,
[and] mark out the contexts where it is natural to
view privacy as crucial.24
DeCew characterizes privacy as a “cluster concept,” and Thomson also
referred to the “privacy cluster.” This notion is familiar to contemporary
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philosophers, and is originally associated with the work of Wittgenstein.

He

claimed that not every concept could be analyzed in terms of a simple set of
logically necessary and sufficient conditions that succinctly articulated the
essence of the concept, and he made his point with the famous example of
games.
Consider for example the proceedings that we call
“games”. I mean board-games, card games, ballgames, Olympic games, and so on. What is common
to them all? - Don’t say: “There must be something
common, or that would not be called ‘games’” - but
look and see whether there is anything common to
all. - For if you look at them you will not see
something common to all, but similarities,
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. …
[T]he result of this examination is: we see a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and
criss-crossing:
sometimes
overall
similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail…
I can think of no better expression to characterize
these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the
various resemblances between members of a family:
build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.
etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I
shall say: ‘games’ form a family.25
Such a view of philosophical analysis was quite popular in the 50s, 60s,
and 70s, and is much less utilized in contemporary work.

It is, however,

commonly accepted that some concepts form a cluster or family. It is not at all
unreasonable to see privacy in such a light. Much more controversial, however,
is the claim that cluster concepts have nothing in common besides family
resemblances. It remains to be seen whether privacy has a single unifying core
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that can be articulated in an all encompassing analysis. As Wittgenstein correctly
saw, I believe, this is a quasi-empirical matter.
Conceptual analysts have reason to be optimistic that unifying models are
possible. The trick is to put into words what we see. If we recognize a family
resemblance between Aunt Sarah and her nephew, what is it?

Card games,

board games, Olympic games, children’s games, may have something in
common, again, what is it? Violations of personal and legal privacy - voyeurism,
snooping, appropriating one’s image, searching without a warrant, denying the
authority to make fundamentally important decisions - may have something in
common, the challenge is to articulate this simple common feature. We may
have had very limited success and this may lead to modesty and pessimism
regarding future attempts.

But it certainly does not follow that the task is

impossible. If the cluster analysis is the best we can do, so be it. There’s plenty
to be learned from good family resemblance analyses.

But, I want to have

another go at a more unified model, one that says something about why these
varied examples of privacy violations are all correctly put under the same
conceptual umbrella.
V. Gavison’s Access Model
Our interest in privacy is related to our concern over
our accessability to others: the extent to which we
are known to others, the extent to which others have
physical access to us, and the extent to which we are
the subject of others attention.26
A. Value Neutrality and Perfect Privacy
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Ruth Gavison offers perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of the
concepts of personal and legal privacy in the current literature. She begins with
a straightforward rejection of the derivative theory, or what she calls reductionist
analyses, of the sort proposed by Thomson.
argues.

Privacy is a useful notion, she

But how could it have such obvious utility in everyday and legal

contexts, if it did not possess a coherent conceptual core? Philosophers and
academic lawyers may have had a difficult time producing an adequate model,
but that should not lead to abandonment of the project, only more hard
analytical work.
Gavison argues that an adequate philosophical and legal analysis of
privacy will need to demonstrate three distinct sorts of conceptual coherence. It
will need to provide satisfying general answers to three related, but obviously
different, sorts of questions.
•

What is privacy? How can we identify losses of privacy when
they have occurred?

•

Why is privacy normatively important?
privacy undesirable?

•

Why is privacy legally important?
legal protection?

Why are losses of

Why should privacy enjoy

Answers to the latter questions are logically dependent on answers to the
former. Thus, we must first discover the nature of personal privacy, before we
will be in a position to say anything informative about its normative importance,
or its legitimate place within liberal legal theory.
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Since we must carefully distinguish the purely analytical question of what
privacy is, from the normative question of why it is important, Gavison insists on
a strong form of value neutrality as a basic criterion for conceptual analysis. To
the degree that conceptual models should have utility to disputants on both sides
of great moral controversies, the insistence that we not beg any interesting
moral questions is essential. A model of privacy that could only be endorsed by
those holding a pro-choice position, for example, would be of little value in
helping to clarify questions of privacy and abortion rights. Gavison, however, is
seeking something even purer in terms of normative impartiality. She aspires to
an analysis of privacy that can be stated without the use of any normative
notions whatsoever. She, therefore, dismisses the idea that privacy is a right, a
claim, a form of control, or a value, and insists that it must be an empirical
situation.
The desire not to preempt our inquiry about the value
of privacy by adopting a value-laden concept at the
outset is sufficient to justify viewing privacy as a
situation of an individual vis-a-vie others, or as a
condition of life.27
The logical nature of such an objective condition of privacy is first approached
through a thought-experiment. Rather than reflecting on everyday examples of
privacy, she asks her readers to imagine total, or what she calls perfect, privacy a condition of complete isolation.
In its most suggestive sense, privacy is a limitation of
others’ access to an individual. As a methodological
starting point, I suggest that an individual enjoys
perfect privacy when he is completely inaccessible to
others.
This may be broken down into three
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independent components: in perfect privacy no one
has information about X, no one pays any attention to
X, and no one has physical access to X.28
Being stranded alone on a desert island, or locked in solitary confinement, or
trapped in a spacecraft that is hurtling out of control into the void, are conditions
of increased privacy, since others have no information about you, nor have
physical access to you, nor pay attention to you. These examples strike us as
odd because none of us want to be stranded on desert islands, locked in solitary,
or hurtling into the void, but we all place great personal value on the enjoyment
of our privacy. Gavison is well aware that there is something counterintuitive in
all of this.
We start from the obvious fact that both perfect
privacy and total loss of privacy are undesirable.
Individuals must be in some intermediate state - a
balance between privacy and interaction - in order to
maintain human relations, develop their capacities
and sensibilities, create and grow, and even to
survive. Privacy thus cannot be said to be a value in
the sense that the more people have of it, the better.
In fact, the opposite may be true.29
Something is surely amiss, here. For one thing, unless the condition of
perfect privacy has been continual since birth, even complete isolation does not
guarantee that one’s privacy cannot be violated. A disreputable publisher could
choose to print a gossipy account of your earlier life while you are stranded on
the desert island.

The publishers, as well as thousands of readers, could

compromise your privacy by finding amusement in the article.

Perhaps even

more surprising, however, is that privacy is characterized as being at odds with
human relationships, the growth of individual capacities and sensibilities; it even
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threatens survival. It is a situation that must be balanced with social interaction.
Most of the literature sees privacy in a very different light.

Rather than a

problem for individual growth and the establishment of important human
relationships, the prevailing view is that privacy is a necessary condition for their
establishment and maintenance.30
B. Coherence and Independence
Although, “[p]rivacy is a term with many meanings,”31 Gavison is
committed to finding a coherent conceptual core. This core can be expressed
“suggestively” as “a limitation of others’ access to an individual.”32 But as we will
see directly, in many privacy violations, the idea of limited access is at best a
metaphor. To discover the non-metaphorical nature of privacy it is necessary to
consider three distinct, and logically independent characteristics of privacy.
Thus, Gavison proposes a cluster analysis of privacy, though she never uses the
Wittgensteinian notion.

Privacy is a concept with an identifiable “family

resemblance” that gives it conceptual coherence, but with characteristics that are
logically independent in the sense that none are individually logically necessary,
nor sufficient.
The concept of privacy suggested here is a complex
of these three independent and irreducible elements:
secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.
Each is
independent in the sense that a loss of privacy may
occur through a change in any one of the three,
without a necessary loss in either of the other two.
The concept is nevertheless coherent because the
three are all part of the same notion of accessibility,
and are related in many important ways.33
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I have already conceded that a well-executed cluster analysis can be of
great philosophical value.

It may seem caviling, therefore, to quarrel with

Gavison’s model, particularly since I believe that it contains most of what we
need to know about personal and legal privacy. My worries are twofold. I am
unconvinced that any of the elements above—secrecy, anonymity, or solitude—
are essential components of personal privacy. They are useful devices for the
protection of privacy, but not analytically central. Secondly, I believe that the
entire analytic strategy got off on the wrong foot by a serious misrepresentation
of the needs and standards for normative neutrality within conceptual models.
Nevertheless, I remain optimistic that by teasing apart the very useful collection
of insights within the accessability to others model, we may yet discover a single
non-metaphorical characteristic that unites the central cases of privacy violation.
C. Gavison’s Three Characteristics of Privacy
Characteristic One—Information known about an individual. One
way that others can gain access to us is through information they have about us.
Obviously, we are dealing with an extended, or metaphorical, sense of gaining
access. If Madonna is vacationing in Australia, and my access to her is a cheesy
tabloid article I am reading about her here in the Pacific Northwest, then the sort
of epistemological access in Gavison’s first characteristic of privacy has nothing
to do with physical space.

Still, the metaphor has resonance, I have gained

access to her life in ways that potentially implicate her privacy.
Gavison noted, in 1980, “the most lively privacy issue now discussed is
related to information-gathering.”34 The observation is even more applicable in
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our post-9/11 world.

Any adequate account of personal privacy will have to

naturally accommodate the centrality of our normative concerns with the control
of personal information.

Gavison’s model does this nicely by addressing

information twice over - once through the metaphor of access by others, and
then again, literally, as an independent and irreducible element.
Perhaps the greatest strength of Gavison’s appeal to information as
conceptually central to privacy is that the standard gambit of attacking by
counter-example is effectively blocked.

Information and knowledge is merely

one method of gaining access to another. It, therefore, counts for very little that
we can enumerate clear cases of privacy violations that have little or nothing to
do with knowledge possessed by others. It would, of course, count against the
model if most of our worries about personal privacy had nothing to do with
information, but as we have seen, many of them clearly do.

It may seem,

therefore, that the inclusion of information as conceptually relevant to privacy,
but neither logically necessary nor sufficient, is just what the doctor ordered.
I stand by my earlier critique of information models, but I concede the
challenge posed by Gavison’s strategy. I must now restrict my argument almost
entirely to an appeal to my readers’ intuitions about violations of their own
privacy.

Suppose, for example, that you were the unfortunate victim in the

following situation.
If secrecy is not treated as an independent element of
privacy, then the following [is] only [one] of the
situations that will not be considered [a] loss of
privacy: … an estranged wife who publishes her
husband’s love letters to her, without his consent.35
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I take it we all agree that you have a normative complaint here, at least in part
because you privacy has been violated. Setting aside other moral concerns like
the clear breaking of trust, what is so distressing about the love letters being
made public?

We can imagine circumstances, of course, where some crucial

confidential fact is disclosed, but in most cases our worries have nothing to do
with personal information. You might even desire that others know that you are
capable of composing mushy proclamations of your undying affection, since this
shows that you have a romantic side to your personality. But you would still
consider the letters private. Gavison addresses the publication of the love letters
as an instance of “information known about an individual,” but I would say that
the case more appropriately turns on the attention of others. As the readers
amuse themselves with your intimate bearing of your soul, you feel violated
because they are focusing their attention on you, and a part of your life that our
culture recognizes as private. As I have said numerous times in this discussion,
any facts or knowledge gained by the reader are incidental, and quite beside the
normative point. And all of this is perfectly compatible with the observation that
keeping the love letters secret will quite effectively spare you the distress.
Characteristic Two—Physical access to an individual. There is, of
course, an obviously non-metaphorical way in which others can gain access to
us. They can put themselves in “physical proximity,” to us where they are “close
enough to touch or observe [us] through normal use of [their] senses.”36
Gavison argues that the fact “that our spatial aloneness has diminished” is cause
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for a potential privacy complaint.

If we accept the value-neutral notion of

“perfect” privacy, then the mere fact of physical access on the part of others
automatically counts as a diminishment of privacy. Whether or not this is the
case, the suggestion that spatial aloneness constitutes a part of the analytic core
of personal privacy is an intriguing, controversial, but I will argue, an ultimately
mistaken, hypothesis.
Gavison claims that a diverse list of privacy violations can be most clearly
appreciated in terms of illegitimate physical access to an individual.
The following situations involving loss of privacy can
best be understood in terms of physical access: (a) a
stranger who gains entrance to a woman’s home on
false pretenses in order to watch her giving birth; (b)
Peeping Toms; (c) a stranger who sits on “our”
bench, even though the park is full of empty benches;
and (d) a move from a single-person office to a much
larger one that must be shared with a colleague. In
each of these cases, the essence of the complaint is
not that more information about us has been
acquired, nor more attention has been drawn to us,
but that our spatial aloneness has been diminished.37
I fully agree with the observation that the acquisition of personal information has
nothing to do with the essential nature of the privacy loss in any of these
examples. I am far from convinced, however, that the diminishment of spatial
aloneness takes us very far, either.
Take the case of the Peeping Tom. Do victims truly feel violated because
others had gained close physical access to them? I very much doubt that this is
the case. It is of course possible, that in certain very specific contexts spatial
considerations exacerbate the feeling of unease. But, in general, doesn’t the

40

offense have more to do with the thoughts and attitudes of the voyeur, and not
his spatial location? By Gavison’s own criteria of close “physical proximity,” the
voyeur who peeks through the window via a telescope does not diminish spatial
aloneness.
The ability to watch and listen, however, is not in
itself an indication of physical access, because Y can
watch X from a distance or wiretap X’s telephone.
This explains why it is much easier for X to know that
Y has physical access to him then when Y observes
him.38
This has very puzzling consequences. The victim of the Peeping Tom who has
her privacy compromised by having her window peeked through has had her
spatial aloneness compromised. But the victim who is spied upon from up the
hill via a very powerful telescope does not suffer this same loss of solitude. But
the latter victim’s privacy has clearly been violated. The only one of Gavison’s
characteristics that potentially covers her complaint is that she has illegitimately
become the object of the voyeur’s attention.

But, isn’t this really a better

account of the first victim’s moral outrage, as well?
Characteristic Three—Attention paid to an individual.

The

characteristic of privacy that I will argue is the most important component in
Gavison’s analysis receives slight attention within the discussion. She introduces
the affective notion of attention from others in a very suggestive passage.
An individual always loses privacy when he becomes
the subject of attention. This will be true whether the
attention is conscious and purposeful, or inadvertent.
Attention is a primary way of acquiring information,
and is sometimes essential to such acquisition, but
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attention alone will cause a loss of privacy even if no
new information becomes known.39
Professor Gavison is very careful to qualify the connection between attention and
the acquisition of personal information with the language of “primary way,” and
“sometimes.” It is not that much of a stretch, however, to wonder if there is not
some stronger connection between the concepts. Perhaps knowing certain sorts
of information about an individual always constitutes a form of paying attention
to that person. Don’t I pay attention to Madonna when I read the sleazy article?
Although the discussion is getting ahead of itself, I am raising the question of
whether the notion of the attention of others is really independent from the
notion knowledge about others.
The strategy that is emerging is to call into question Gavison’s claim that
her privacy characteristics are logically independent and irreducible. We have
seen in the case of the love letters that what she takes to be a central case of a
privacy violation in terms of information known about another can not only be
reduced to a case of attention paid to an individual, but in fact, more plausibly
be so characterized. In a similar vain, the case of the Peeping Tom, reduced
with greater normative insight from an instance of physical access to an
individual to one of attention being illegitimately paid. To make good on the
stronger hypothesis to be offered in the next section, I will need to convince my
readers that all cases, of informational violations of privacy, and not just a few
convenient ones, can be reduced to illegitimate attention being paid to an
individual. And also, that all instances of loss of privacy resulting from physical
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access to an individual can plausibly be re-characterized as cases in terms of
illegitimate attention by others.
VI. Immunity from the Focused Attention of Others
Private” used in this . . . immunity-claiming way is
both norm-dependent and norm-invoking. It is norm
dependent because private affairs and private rooms
cannot be identified without some reference to
norms. So any definition of the concept of “private
affairs” must presuppose the existence of some
norms restricting unlicenced observation, reporting, or
entry, even though no norm in particular is necessary
to the concept. It is norm-invoking in that one need
say no more than “This is a private matter” to claim
that anyone not invited to concern himself with it
ought to stay out of it.40
A. Norm-dependent Concepts
To leave all reference to values out of a conceptual model of a normative
notion can result, not in normative neutrality, but an impoverished conceptual
picture. Stanley Benn gets it exactly right above when he observes that the
concept of privacy allows us to claim a certain kind of norm-dependent immunity
from others.

The exact nature of this immunity is, of course, still a matter

dispute. We have seen that many scholars have seen it as an immunity from the
knowledge of others.

Other theorists have articulated the prerogative as an

immunity from the judgment of others. And, although she eschews anything
that is not strictly value-neutral, Ruth Gavison’s model treats personal privacy as
an immunity from the access of others.
The implicit appeal to preexisting norms becomes clear when we see that,
at least in the case of immunity from knowledge, or immunity from judgment, no
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serious scholar has suggested any thing like a blanket immunity. Obviously we
possess all sorts personal information, and know quite a bit, about others
without violating their privacy. And we clearly form all sorts of judgments about
others, both positive and negative, without compromising their privacy. Thus, if
privacy consists of an immunity from knowledge or judgment, it is only within
certain very specific and largely culturally defined areas of a person’s life. We
can make this disguised appeal to existing norms explicit by recognizing that an
implicit decision as to what is legitimate and illegitimate underlies appropriate
uses of the concept of privacy.
models of privacy.

All of this suggests a pattern for theoretical

Rather than defining privacy in terms of some general

immunity, X, it will be more perspicuous to characterize it as an immunity from

illegitimate instances of X.
Ruth Gavison was insistent that her conceptual definition eschew any use
of value-laden components. Her mistake, I would argue, was not her admirable
desire for a non-question-begging model, but in ignoring the value-dependence
of the concept she was analyzing.

Her central insights become much more

plausible when privacy is recast as an immunity from the illegitimate access of
others.

The three characteristics she identifies as independent aspects of

personal privacy also gain increased plausibility when they are articulated as
limited areas of immunity - thus, immunity from illegitimate information being
known by others, immunity from the illegitimate attention of others, and
immunity from illegitimate physical access by others. Such a reformulation of
the access model completely does away with the need for the artificial, and I
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think misleading, notion of perfect privacy. But at the same time, it allows us to
see how complete physical inaccessibility would contingently guarantee that
there was no form of illegitimate access on the part of others.
B. No One’s Business
James Rachels suggests that we would be well-advised to more seriously
investigate the colloquial expression, “none of your business,” for conceptual
clues regarding personal privacy.
A woman may rightfully be upset if her credit-rating is
adversely affected by a report about her sexual
behavior because the use of such information is
unfair; however, she may also object to the report
simply because she feels - as most of us do - that her
sex life is nobody else’s business. This, I think, is an
extremely important point. We have a “sense of
privacy” which is violated in such affairs, and this
sense of privacy cannot adequately be explained
merely in terms of our fear of being embarrassed or
disadvantaged in one of these obvious ways. An
adequate account of privacy should help us
understand what makes something “someone’s
business” and why intrusions into things that are
“none of your business” are, as such, offensive.41
I would argue that the “none of your business” test does at least as good a job
of delineating the bounds of personal privacy as any of the sophisticated
analyses considered so far.
Judith DeCew demurred the possibility of producing a unitary model of
privacy, but I think she has actually managed to articulate one of the most
promising candidates in the literature - one that fits quite nicely with the none of
your business insight.
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I [have] developed a proposal that takes the realm of
the private to be whatever is not, according to a
reasonable person in normal circumstances, the
legitimate concern of others. Clearly, the proposal as
it stands is vague and overbroad.42
One philosopher’s vagueness and over-breadth, it appears, is another’s helpful
insight. Reflection on psychological activity that colloquial speech characterizes
as concerning ourselves with another holds great promise as analytical device for
probing the contours of personal privacy.
What is it to concern ourselves with another? What is it for others to
make our business theirs?

A cinemagraphic metaphor is helpful here. There is

a kind of zooming in, or tightening of cognitive and emotional focus.

The

cocktail party is crowded and noisy; I hear random bits of several scattered
conversations. All of the sudden I am struck with your animated exchange with
your lover.

I move in and actively listen to what you’re discussing.

I have

concerned myself with your particular conversation; I’ve made it my business.
And, of course, in the context imagined, I have done all of this quite
illegitimately.
C. The Focused Attention of Others
Information models of privacy postulate what I have called an
epistemological relationship between the individual enjoying the immunity
afforded by privacy conventions and others who would potentially violate that
immunity.

For Gavison the relationship is a spatial one, with concepts of

distance, and spatial and sensory barriers, lurking in the background. One of the
advantages I would still claim for the judgment of others model is that it recast
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the privacy relationship in much more candidly affective terms. Individuals were
seen as enjoying immunity from certain kinds of conscious thoughts and
attitudes on the part of others.

It turned out, of course, that the notion of

judgment was too narrow to capture all of the illegitimate thoughts and attitudes
through which others might violate another’s privacy.
With a candid acknowledgment that the original inspiration came from
Gavison’s characteristic of attention of others, I would like to propose the
following as the single conceptual core of personal privacy.43 Privacy

demarcates those areas of people’s lives where they are granted - both
by cultural norms and legal traditions - limited immunity from the
focused attention of others. I put this forward not in the classical tradition of
a single necessary and sufficient condition, but as an explanatory hypothesis.
Immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others as a rubric for
personal privacy provides, I claim, the simplest, most complete, non-ad hoc,
account; it is for these reasons the most plausible model.
As anyone who has ever put forward an interpretive theory knows, it is
much easier to attack one’s rivals, than to construct a positive defense. I can
think of no other way of proceeding than reassemble the clear cases of personal
privacy, and privacy violations, and then see whether the attention of others
model successfully captures the central concerns.
•

Others illegitimately gain access to your medical or financial
records.

•

Others illegitimately publish the above information.
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•

Others search or monitor your office, but find nothing.

•

Another peeps in your window.

•

Another lectures you on personal decisions you have made.

•

Another [a state actor] unreasonably searches you.

•

Another [the state] illegitimately interferes with an intimate and
“fundamentally important” personal decision.

Illegitimate access to, and the publication of, sensitive personal records,
of course, deal with the ever present concepts of personal knowledge and
information. I take it that there is nothing artificial or ad hoc in postulating a
concern with the illegitimate focused attention of others as underlying our
privacy concerns in connection to the forbidden acquisition and dissemination of
personal information. The failed office monitoring reminds us, again, that mere
attempts to acquire information involve an active focusing of attention by others;
from which we may be granted some limited immunity. Voyeurism shows how
our privacy can be compromised via the standard sensory means by which we
gather much of our knowledge and yet have little to do with the gathering of
information - our culture and legal system protects us from these noninformational instances of focused attention by others, nevertheless. A general,
though at the same time very limited, immunity, not just from the knowledge of
others, or the physical access of others, but the attitudes of others, allows to
fully appreciate instances of illegitimate judgment and meddling in another’s
personal affairs such as the overbearing mentor. He focuses his attention on his
research assistant - her person, her life, and her intimate decisions - in ways that
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clearly violate our culture’s norms. We see that these concerns can be captured
by the concept of personal privacy, not just because they can plausibly be recast
as areas of immunity from focused attention, but also by how naturally the
expression, “none of his business,” applies.

The last instance from the brief

inventory above that falls within the immunity from the illegitimate focused
attention of others with complete ease, are instances of unreasonable state
searches. In ways strongly analogous to those in which individuals can focus
their attention on you to gather information, or simply to snoop, government can
also focus its attention on individual citizens. The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution happily guarantees its citizens immunity from such
attention in the form of “unreasonable”searches and seizures.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Privacy
A serious challenge for the immunity from the focused attention of others
is, perhaps, presented by instances of Due Process privacy.

It is matter of

considerable disagreement whether the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,44 or the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee citizens a right to
make fundamentally important personal decisions. Justice Brennan was only one
of the many justices who believed that it did.
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to
bear or beget a child.45
Other distinguished jurists, of course, have seen the matter very differently.
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The Court talks about a constitutional “right of
privacy” as though there is some constitutional
provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be
passed which might abridge the “privacy” of
individuals. But there is not. . . . I like my privacy
as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that government has a right to
invade it unless prohibited by some specific
constitutional provision.46
Several privacy scholars have suggested that so called “decisional” privacy
is at best a derivative or metaphorical notion, and at worst a simple linguistic
mistake. Thus, Parent, from his perspective of semantic legislation is emphatic.
[A] person who is prohibited by law from making
certain choices should be described as having been
denied liberty or freedom to make them. . . . [W]e
can meaningfully say that the right to liberty
embraces in part the right of persons to make
fundamentally important choices about their lives and
therewith to exercise significant control over different
aspects of their behavior.
[This] is clearly
distinguishable from the right of privacy which the
condemns unwarranted acquisition of undocumented
personal knowledge.47
Ruth Gavison is less the semantic legislator, but argues much the same position
in terms of conceptual and jurisprudential clarity.
[I]dentifying privacy as noninterference with private
action, often in order to avoid an explicit return to
“substantive due process,” may obscure the nature of
the legal decision and draw attention away from
important considerations.
The limit of state
interference with individual action is an important
question that has been with us for centuries. The
usual terminology for dealing with this question is
that of “liberty of action.” It may well be that some
cases pose a stronger claim for noninterference than
others, and that the intimate nature of certain
decisions affects these limits. This does not justify
naming this set of concerns “privacy,” however. A
better way to deal with these issues may be to treat
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them as involving questions of liberty, in which
enforcement may raise difficult privacy issues.(52)
Although there is a clear difference between the sort of immunity from
state attention that the Fourth Amendment affords citizens, and the immunity
from state interference recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, I think it is entirely appropriate to use the concept of privacy to
describe both of them. For one thing, it quite natural to respond to the state’s
concerns with contraception, abortion decisions, choices about the end of one’s
life, and issues of sexual intimacy, with the dismissal that it is none of their
business.

And, indeed, those on the other side of these substantive

controversies implicitly respond in terms of personal privacy, arguing that the
protection of fetal life, or the state’s interest in prohibiting homosexual sodomy,
are precisely the sorts of thing that democratic governments should concern
themselves with.

I am an unashamed partisan on these questions; I am

convinced they are unquestionably none of the state’s business.

But I fully

recognize that equally reflective people see these matters differently.

In the

present context, I am simply trying to locate the conceptual home for our
debate, and describing it as a disagreement over the parameters of Fourteenth
Amendment privacy seems linguistically true.
There are at least two ways in which government can focus its attention,
and sometimes its illegitimate attention, on its citizens. The first, of course, is in
ways analogous to tabloid reporters, snoops, and voyeurs. It can single you out
as a person; tapping your phone, investigating your banking records, or
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searching your car. The state can also focus its attention on you because you
fall within a group engaged in a kind of behavior.

Government focuses, for

example, on speeders, passing laws restricting choices to drive beyond
prescribed limits. Almost all of us concede that this is a quite legitimate instance
of focused attention.

We are much less comfortable, however, when the

attention focuses on choices that are “fundamentally important” and intimate such as those dealing with reproduction, pregnancy, sexuality, and death.
E. Focused Attention and Spatial Aloneness
In the course of defending her access model of privacy, Ruth Gavison
included the little laundry list of instances where individuals’ privacy was clearly
compromised that I have already quoted.48 One of her examples is a potentially
serious problem for the immunity from focused attention model.
The following situation[] involving loss of privacy can
best be understood in terms of physical access . . .
a stranger who chooses to sit on “our” bench, even
thought the park is full of empty benches.(54)
The first thing that must be conceded is how natural it is to use the rubric of
privacy to articulate the normative concerns raised in this example. You and I
are in the park together on the bench.

Perhaps we are lovers and our

conversation is intimate; perhaps we are colleagues and the discussion is
professional; or perhaps we are casual acquaintances and talking about last
night’s ball game. When the stranger chooses “our” bench over all the empty
ones we are on alert and offended. Why? If my analysis of privacy is correct,
our moral complaint must concentrate on the stranger’s focused attention on us.
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We suspect he has focused on us. Why else has he chosen “our” bench? We
worry that he will further focus on our conversation.

All of this focused

attention, actual and potential, is quite illegitimate in our cultural context.
But isn’t this a little strained? Gavison claims that the mere condition of
his physical access, regardless of imputed motives or other psychological states
of the stranger, is enough to trigger privacy concerns.

I certainly want to

concede that there are complicated and mysterious conventions concerning
interpersonal distance and other spatial considerations in our culture. Anyone
who has spoken with people from different cultures with different “conversational
distances,” or simply individuals who are insensitive to our conventions, knows
that too much, and particularly too little, distance can be quite unsettling. The
park example gains part of its punch, not so much from privacy conventions, but
from other spatial conventions that we all recognize, even if we find them
difficult to articulate.
I think we see that psychological features like focused attention are
central to our privacy concerns by imagining them to be absent in the stranger
scenario. Suppose that he is lonely, speaks not a word of English, and simply
desires closeness. Even if we are still somewhat uncomfortable, the fact that our
conversation is not the focus of his attention, certainly alleviates some of our
privacy concerns. What if he’s blind and deaf, and was completely unaware that
we were sitting on “his” bench?
privacy?

Could the stranger accidentally violate our

On Gavison’s spatial access model perhaps he could.

But I would

argue that accidental violations of personal privacy, at least in the present
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context, make no sense.

And, indeed, the necessity for some kind of intent

becomes an argument for the illegitimate focused attention perspective, since
the psychological, and perhaps normative, intentions of privacy violators
emerges as part of meaning of a privacy violation. And this is just what we
should expect, given the norm dependence of the concept of privacy.
VI. Two Approaches to Rules
[I]s privacy's value best described in consequentialist
or deontological terms? Case law mentions that
privacy is valuable for such diverse purposes as
"promotion of free discourse," "to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness," "leading lives
in health and safety" in the home, "to keep secret or
intimate facts about oneself from the preying eyes of
ears of others," and the promotion of personal
relationships. With claims such as these, the courts
suggest that privacy is valuable because of its
desirable consequences.
Yet there is also a
deontological strand in legal privacy theory. The law
contains suggestions that privacy's value stems from
respect for "man's spiritual nature," "individual
dignity," and "inviolate personality." Since a
consequentialist account of privacy's value will
ultimately clash with a deontological account, we
must arbitrate between them if we decide that privacy
does possess an independent value.49
The

history

of

normative

thought

teaches

that

consequentialist

justifications of moral positions must forever be at war with deontological
defenses. Much of academic law seems to have bought into a similar approach
to legal rules.

This curious since scholars have long noticed that rules - in

games, legal contexts, or basic ethical principles - can be examined from both a
forward looking perspective the assesses the future consequences of new rules
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and changes to existing rules, and a backward looking perspective that seeks to
correct injustice and unfairness.
John Rawls illustrated this important point about rules with the classic
example of legal punishment.
One can say, then, that the judge and the legislator
stand in different positions and look in different
directions: one to the past, the other to the future.
The justification of what the judge does, qua judge,
sounds like the retributive view; the justification of
what the (ideal) legislator does, qua legislator, sounds
like the utilitarian view. Thus both sides have a point
(this is as it should be since intelligent and sensitive
persons have been on both sides of the argument);
and one's initial confusion disappears once one sees
that these views apply to persons holding different
offices and duties, and situated differently with
respect to the system of rules that make up the
criminal law.50
Rawls' distinction between a rule administrator's perspective on rules, and a
policy maker's perspective is both insightful, and misleading. The umpire has no
choice but to call the batter our on the third strike, the rules clearly state what is
to be done, and her job is to see to it that balls and strikes are determined, and
that the rules are carried out.

It makes no difference if all sorts of good

consequences would follow from allowing this particular batter to have four
strikes. But when the Rules Committee meets to consider changes in the rules –
should the designated hitter rule be standardized?, or done away with? –
potential good and bad effects of the changes dominate the discussion.
Even as much of judicial activist as Dworkin admits that most judicial work
involves easy cases.51 Jurisprudential questions about what the law is get the
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scholarly attention, but most of a judge's time is spent like the umpire
determining balls and strikes and sending players to first base or back to the
dugout based on these calls. One need not be a conservative to believe that a
judge's first responsibility is to interpret and administer existing law, not to make
new law. Legislators, however, are supposed to make new and better laws. It is
hard to imagine how they could adequately exercise this responsibility without
paying primary attention to the social, financial, and perhaps legal effects of their
proposed changes and creations. Utilitarian questions like the deterrent effect of
some proposed increase in punishment, or potential gains in economic efficiency
resulting from common law changes in accident law, do sound a lot like the sorts
of things that policy makers like the members of the rules committee, or elected
legislators, should be asking themselves. Deontological questions, however, like
what punishment does this convicted criminal deserve, or what is the fairest
settlement of this particular law suit, sound more like the umpire making tough
calls - ball or strike, fair or foul, out our safe - but working within a context
where the rules are already spelled out.
This tidy compartmentalization is compromised, however, by a number of
practical and legal considerations. First, of course, is the simple fact that both
judges and legislators are human beings who think and act both inside and
outside their institutional roles at the same time. Judges can be fully aware of
what the law is, yet still be concerned with the economic, social, and legal
consequences of their decisions. Indeed, we would be disappointed were they
not.

Similarly, a legislator's vote on a crucial bill may be every much as
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dependant on his sense of what is just and fair as it is on any utilitarian
calculation of the potential consequences of the proposed legislation.

Rule

administrators, as well as rule makes, will therefore be doomed to contemplate
their actions from both the forward-looking perspective, and the backwardlooking perspective, at the same time.
Most damaging of all to the Rawlsian taxonomy, however, is that the most
perplexing questions about rules fall in between the stark extremes of decisions
to have a rule or not, and decisions about what the rule dictates. Consider the
contemporary debate about capital punishment.

We have pretty clear moral

rules about killing people. These moral rules have always been enshrined in
criminal law. Utilitarian arguments - deterrence, public safety, the avoidance of
private revenge - have always been a part of the moral and policy defense of the
rules proscribing criminal homicide.

Within specific jurisdictions the rules

articulate maximum criminal penalties. A judge's potential sentence is bound by
these existing rules. But, what happens when the debate is not about whether
we should have rules against murder, but what the maximum punishment should
be? Rawls is uneqivocal.
The decision whether or not to use law rather than
some other mechanism of social control, and the
decision as to what laws to have and what
penalties to assign, may be settled by utilitarian
arguments.52
Such an emphatic assignment of the creation and change of criminal penalties to
utilitarian policy making may seem surprising coming from a philosopher who
would be one of the most outspoken critics of utilitarianism, but very much in
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keeping with the spirit of the early 1950s where utilitarian thinking dominated
criminology. In the contemporary debate about capital punishment, however,
the Rawlsian assignment seems both artificial and normatively misleading.
Consequentialist considerations – is the death penalty a more effect deterrent to
murder than lengthy prison sentences?, what is the cost of an average execution
compared to life imprisonment?, etc. – play a huge part in the debate. But it is
painfully obvious that retributive arguments, along with other considerations of
procedural and corrective justice, play an equally dominant role – what should be
the ultimate price for first-degree murder?, is capital punishment administered in
an arbitrary and capricious manner?
When all is said and done, I would argue, the safest response is to simply
acknowledge that both backward-looking and forward-looking arguments have
always played legitimate roles in our thinking about moral and legal rules. Our
task is not some grand ontological theory about moral truth, but a better
understanding of how we think – as human beings and as members of this
culture – about these questions. When the issue is our privacy, our immunity
form the illegitimate focused attention of others, it is obvious to me that both
backward-looking and forward-looking considerations will be integral parts of a
full understanding of the normative importance of privacy.
VII. Forward-Looking Justifications of Privacy
[The right to privacy] deals . . . with a cluster of
immunities which, if acknowledged, curb the freedom
of others to do things that are generally quite
innocent if done to objects other than persons, and
even to persons, if done with their permission. There
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is nothing intrinsically objectionable in observing the
world, including its inhabitants, and in sharing one's
discoveries with anyone who finds them interesting;
and this is not on account of any special claims, for
instance, for scientific curiosity, or for a public interest
in the discovery of truth.
For I take it as a
fundamental principle in morals a general liberty to do
whatever one chooses unless someone else has a
good reasons for interfering to prevent it . . . The
onus of justification, in brief, lies on the advocate of
restraint, not on the person restrained.53
A. Rules, Liberty, and the Focused Attention of Others
Rules constrain free choice. The umpire must send the batter to first base
after ball four, the rules say so. I must drive on the right side of the road even
though the address I am looking for is more easily seen from the left. Failure to
respect privacy limit may your options by focusing my illegitimate attention on
you. Stanley Benn postulated a fundamental normative principle that the onus
lies with proponents of rules that limit free choice, and this seems exactly right.
The policy maker, or the anthropologist trying to reconstruct a functional account
of social norms, is most likely to appeal to good consequences brought about by
the rules, even though they limit options. We value freedom, but constrain it in
certain ways because the constraints make the world better than it would
otherwise be.

This is the logic of the classical social contract, cutting-edge

economics of law, and the solution to the prisoner's dilemma. Even when the
normative considerations in favor of adopting the rules are articulated in
deontological terms like justice or respect for persons, the argument still has a
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forward-looking flavor to it. The world will be better in the future with the rules,
than it was in the past without them.
The forward-looking calculations that would justify rules granting
individuals immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others will have to
very compelling. Focusing attention on another is not simply an idle choice like
deciding to ware a Hawaiian shirt rather than a plaid one. We are all, to some
degree, voyeurs and gossips.

Cultures vary in their judgments about the

seriousness and parameters of "observing the world, including its inhabitants,
and sharing one's discoveries with anyone who finds them interesting," but all
cultures recognize that people do these things.

Thus, privacy rules seek to

constrain a very natural human tendency that we all have to focus attention on
others. If this were not challenging enough, the focused attention of others has
clear good consequences for society as a whole. What others know and think
about us obviously affects our behavior. It significantly improves the chances we
will do the morally correct thing, the thing that the law requires. Nevertheless,
most of us recognize that regardless of how natural it is to disregard privacy, and
how inconvenient privacy rules may be when it comes to fighting crime or a
“war” on terror; rules demarcating areas of immunity from the focused attention
of others are important enough to outweigh these counter forces.
B. Pain and the Attention of Others
I assume that victims of privacy violations typically experience tangible
psychological pain. Some might argue that this pain is a cultural artifact, and
that there are, or at least we can imagine there might be, cultures where none of
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the things we treat as private would be seen as in any way sensitive or intimate.
Perhaps we can imagine societies. So what? Three things pain me as I am
writing this section. A tooth is bothering me, and I fear a visit to the dentist is in
order.

The chronic ache in my left knee is acting up, and short of surgery,

aspirin will have to do.

And I'm having a big fight with my bosses about

retaining a position in my department, and it's driving me crazy. The first two
instances of pain are well-understood physiological occurrences that no doubt
have evolutionary explanations.

The last is an all too familiar example of

contemporary capitalist and corporate culture, with a twist that is somewhat
idiosyncratic to the academy. There is nothing intrinsically pain inducing about a
resource being reallocated within an organization. I am smart enough to realize
that from a purely selfish perspective, the change has almost no effect on my
job. Issues of departmental prestige, and probably unfair worries about arbitrary
and vindictive administrative decisions, are in no sense a natural part of a human
being's biological existence. But, again, so what? If you ask me which pain I
would most like to rid myself of, there's no question.

The unfairness of the

decision gnaws at me - it upsets my stomach, causes me to lose sleep, and just
plain bums me out - while the discomfort from the tooth and knee easily recede
to the background. The fact that it has a psycho-social origin, rather than a
physiological one, is irrelevant from my phenomenological perspective.
I suspect, however, that responding to illegitimate focused attention with
alarm, discomfort, and pain, might actually have an ancient biological origin.
And other privacy scholars have had similar intuitions .
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Alan Westin, for

example, writing over a generation and a half ago offered a very contemporary
sounding socio-biological account of privacy.
Man likes to think that his desire for privacy is
distinctively human, a function of his unique ethical,
intellectual, and artistic needs. Yet studies of animal
behavior and social organization suggest that man's
need for privacy may well be rooted in his animal
origins, and that men and animals share several basic
mechanisms for claiming privacy among their
fellows.54
It would be surprising were we not genetically predisposed to register the
focused attention of others.

Many species are keenly aware of an individual

organism's gaze within their own species - rivals and potential mates - and of the
gaze of other species - predators and prey. Within highly complex social species
like our own, the biological advantages of heightened sensitivity to the attention
of others becomes even more complicated and important. One of the persistent
problems, of course, for this kind of socio-biological hypotheses is how to
marshal compelling evidence, a task that is certainly beyond my area of
expertise.

Thus, I am reduced to thought-experiment and appeals to my

readers' intuitions.
Imagine that you are out to dinner and a rude stranger continues to stare
at you. Imagine that the voyeur watches you in an intimate moment. Imagine
that your finances or medical problems are published in the tabloids. You are
pained by this. But is this simply a learned response on your part? Now culture
plays a part here, but is it the whole story? A common misconception is that
nature and nurture offer rival accounts of behavior and other phenotypical
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characteristics. But any evolutionary theorist will tell you that nature and nurture
always work as partners in explaining anything of interest in the biological world.
We know, for example, that the disposition to sing has clear genetic origins in
song birds. The fact remains, however, that they must learn how to sing. If
individuals are not exposed to the songs of their own species in their youth, they
are doomed to the production of pitiful sounds that are at best a poor parody of
the beautiful and individually unique compositions of their socially trained
fellows.55 Our culture teaches us a lot about personal privacy. I take that as a
given. But it is not unreasonable to speculate that the experience of pain that
normal human beings experience when they are victims of illegitimate focused
attention of others is partly biological. And this will be true even if it is our
culture that largely defines the boundaries of what is legitimate and illegitimate,
and even if we are capable of learning to live with lots of focused attention in our
daily lives.
One clear reason, therefore, for circumscribing general liberty and placing
moral and legal restrictions on certain kinds of focused attention is that it causes
harm to others when their privacy is not respected. We place moral, common
law, and criminal restrictions on punching people in the nose largely because it
hurts so damn much to be a victim of one of these punches. It doesn't really
matter whether the pain of being the victim of illegitimate focused attention is
more like my frustrations with my bosses, or more like the songbird with a
genetic predisposition to sing. Whatever the origins of the pain we feel when
our privacy is violated, a world that avoids this pain is much better than one that
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allows it. And, as with almost every insight in the privacy literature, this one's
been around for a long time.
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the
heightening of sensations which came with the
advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only
a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in
physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations
demanded legal recognition.56
C. Privacy and Social and Political Freedom
None of us would desire to live in a world of complete privacy. I am not
imagining, here, Gavison's perfect privacy, which we saw was nothing more than
complete isolation.

Rather, the thought-experiment is one of total immunity

from the focused attention of others.

The reason we would not want such

immunity, of course, is that complete privacy seems a causally sufficient
condition for complete freedom, and complete freedom sounds an awful lot like a
Hobbesian state of nature. None of us trust our comrades enough to grant them
total freedom.
This obvious line of thought has led some scholars to wonder just how
normatively valuable privacy is in the first place. Don't these immunities simply
provide a shield that furthers the cause of crime, sexual and spousal abuse, and
other sorts of social and moral evil? It is undeniable that there is a tangible
social cost to the robust recognition of areas of immunity from the judgment and
focused attention of others. People will, no doubt, take advantage of the privacy
of their homes, or their relationships, or their conversations, or their e-mail
exchanges, to do things that we not only wish they would not do, but which
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moral and legal rules proscribe. But most of us, including the most outspoken
communitarian and feminist skeptics, see independent value in personal privacy.
The reason is obvious. The privacy which allows crime and wrong to take place
away from the focused attention of the rest of us, also allows individual liberty
and autonomy to flourish.

The world is better with some real privacy in it

because the world is better when individuals have some genuine freedom.
Forward-looking justifications of privacy in terms of freedom and
autonomy are common in the literature. The virtues of political and legal liberty
have received the lion's share the scholarly attention. This makes sense because
the focused attention of government on an individual's behavior is so tangible.
We all know how driving patterns on the interstate are changed when others see
the trooper's patrol car. Now speeding is a bad thing, and the focused attention
of law enforcement on speeders is far from illegitimate, but when that same
attention is focused on other aspects of our lives, most of us are uncomfortable.
Government's attention is often judgmental - is this criminal, or subversive, or
otherwise socially undesirable?

Most of this judgmental attention is a good

thing; that's why we have the laws and police officers in the first place. But
liberal societies insist that individuals be granted certain areas of immunity from
this official focused attention. We grant these areas of legal, constitutional, and
moral immunity at least in part because we value freedom and autonomy within
these areas.
As worrisome as the illegitimate focused attention of legal and political
authority is, however, it is probably not the greatest threat to individual liberty.
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This point has been made time and again in the literature, but remains all too
easy to forget. John Stuart Mill saw it clearly.
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was
at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as
operating through the acts of the public autorities.
But reflecting persons perceived that when society is
itself the tyrant - society collectively over the separate
individual who compose it - its means of tyrannizing
are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the
hands of its political functionaries. Society can and
does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong
mandates instead of right, of any mandates at all in
things which it ought not to meddle, it practices a
social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of
political oppression, since, though not usually upheld
by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the
details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.57
Mill's famous solution to the problem of tyranny of the majority was to articulate
a limit on both social and legal mandates - the behavior and choices proscribed
had to run a real danger of causing harm to others. But Mill's problem from the
very beginning was that almost any behavior has some potential harmful effect
on others. And since it is the majority who is doing the alleged tyrannizing, this
majority of citizens have already registered their judgment that the proscribed
behavior constitutes a tangible social threat. Thus, Mill's protection evaporates
to an empty limit on social and legal constraints on freedom and choice.
Perhaps the recognition of personal privacy is a more efficient means of
filtering out the inappropriate judgments and proscriptions of society. Greater
individual liberty and autonomy will exist in a society that recognizes immunity
from the illegitimate focused attention of others. This is precisely the forward-
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looking normative justification of personal privacy that was presented in
Ferdinand Schoeman's insightful last work.58 He fully concedes the importance
of a closely connected social arrangement that will necessarily include what I am
calling the focused attention of others. Such a society is necessary, among other
things, for the very preconditions of liberty and autonomy.
Much of what is most important about our life would
be lost, would be inaccessible to us, were we
uninfluenced - unpressured, if you will - by what we
see around us. Most, if not all, of our effectiveness
as social agents would be undermined by the
elimination of the kinds of pressures and influences
that philosophers in the analytic tradition treat as
rationally corrupting. . . . Most of our protections
from a monolithic social and political tyranny depend
on participation in associations. The survival and
effectiveness of these associations presuppose the
availability of forces to bring about conformity with
group norms - forces such as loyalty to group
participants, methods, and ends.59
Granted that social pressure is a good thing in both the culture as a
whole, and in smaller associations like family and friends.

Focused attention

helps produce adherence to group-defined norms. At the same time, however,
too much focused attention produces blind conformity and a loss of individual
autonomy.

According to Schoeman, the most important function of personal

privacy is to regulate the fine line between the appropriate social pressure that
produces order and genuine associations, and the excessive social pressure that
precludes freedom and autonomy. And as important as it is to have immunity
from legal and governmental pressure, immunity from a more amorphous social
pressure is even more crucial to genuine social freedom and individual liberty.
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I aim to understand the dimensions of privacy that
arise in our social encounters. I argue that privacy in
the contexts of our social relations protects us from
social overreaching - limits the control of others over
our lives.60
This sort of forward-looking functional account of the value of privacy
conventions does not, of course, imply any sort of conscious awareness of the
salutatory effects on the part of anyone. The subtle forces of cultural selection,
just like many of the factors in natural selection, may operate at levels far
removed from the cultural and normative justifications familiar to most members
of the society, or even to humanists and social scientists producing scholarly
analyses of the conventions.

The beauty of an account such as Schoeman's

"overreaching hypothesis" is that it allows us to get a glimmer of the cultural
mechanisms that must have been at work, even though it is hard to imagine any
conclusively confirming data to be discovered, or any crucial experiment to be
conducted.
X. Backward-Looking Justifications of Privacy
By insisting that there are personal boundaries that
the state may not overstep, interior regions into
which it cannot penetrate, liberalism expresses its
respect for the inherent dignity, equality, individuality,
interiority, and subjectivity of the individuals who
compose it. Inviolabiity is a form of equality; people
who are less than equal are people who can be
violated. A liberal state respects the fact that each
individual has some precious and incommensurable
inner essence that must be protected from official
scrutiny.61
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A. Backward-Looking Perspectives on Legal Rules
Much of the literature on the moral significance of privacy seeks to expand
on the forward-looking, or consequentialist, justifications just discussed. Almost
every theorist will grant that there is pain engendered by illegitimate focused
attention, and that the absence of privacy is contingently related to diminished
personal freedom and autonomy. Many scholars, however, suggest that there is
something deeper at stake in our concern with privacy. The recognition of areas
of immunity from the illegitimate focused attention of others may result in a
world where there is less pain, and more freedom, but this immunity has other,
perhaps more profound, normative virtues. The literature claims, for example,
that privacy is connected with "man's spiritual nature,"62 that it provides "moral
capital" for the formation of significant personal relationships like friendship and
love,63 that it is fundamental to human intimacy,64 and it "is a social ritual by
means of which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred."65 All of
these fascinating, and often profound, normative analyses seem to me to have,
despite their often explicit rejection of consequentialism, a forward-looking
orientation to rules. They all attempt to blend moral insights, facts about social
psychology, and phenomenological reflections on privacy and its violation, and to
then explain why a world that respects areas of limited immunity from the
focused attention of others is better than a world without such privacy
protection. In a sense, however, they simply provide additional detail supporting
the general forward-looking considerations of protecting individuals from pain,
and facilitating greater personal autonomy and freedom.
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B. Respect for Persons
Kant's famous categorical imperative, in its second articulation, reads as
follows.
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person, or that of another, always as an end and
never as a means only.66
Kant recognized that there was something special, both psychologically and
normatively, about human beings. Simply in virtue of being a part of humanity,
people are entitled to special moral consideration. Although we all treat each
other as means to our ends, the categorical imperative requires that we also
treat one another as an "ends" as well.

We are required, so says Kant, to

recognize that individuals are psychologically unique, having their own dreams
and fears, and that they are agents acting out their own lives according to their
own choices, values, and goals. Human beings are persons, in a philosophically
technical sense, and they are entitled to respect simply in virtue of this special
characteristic of personhood.
A number of contemporary scholars have suggested that the Kantian
principle of respect for persons gets at the normative heart of personal privacy.67
Granted there all sorts of forward-looking advantages to granting immunity from
the focused attention of others, but the underlying moral claim is grounded on
the simple fact that we are people, and that personal privacy is one of the rights
we have for this reason alone.
A principle of respect for persons is generated from
an underlying notion of personhood. Because a
human possesses certain morally significant traits of
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personhood, she is entitled to be treated with respect
with regard to those traits. These traits have been
characterized in a variety of ways (e.g., selfconsciousness and moral agency), but the
characteristic that has been brought to the forefront
of privacy theory is the human capacity for rational
choice. Given that an agent possesses that capacity,
it follows that she has a justified moral claim to being
treated with the respect due to a person.68
The Kantian insight is to some degree an empirical hypothesis. Cognitive
psychology, sociology, as well as common human experience, combine to tell a
familiar story. We are not only a conscious species, but a self-conscious one.
We learn very early in life to be aware, not just of the world and the others who
share it, but of ourselves, and what others are thinking about us. The focused
attention of others causes us us to become aware of ourselves. This is often a
good thing. But there are occasions where its very bad indeed. In the first
place, it causes pain. Secondly, it interferes with free agency. Remember the
interruption of traffic patterns on the interstate when drivers see the state patrol
car, or reflect on your own disinclination to sing along with your favorite CD
when others are present. All of this, of course, is the forward-looking package of
considerations that lie hidden in our cultural, and perhaps biological, history, and
that at least partially explain the origins of our limited immunity from the
illegitimate focused attention of others.

But the conventions, the normative

rules, and the laws which codify this immunity are firmly in place now, and help
to define what it is to be a full-fledged person in this culture. Simply because of
the kind of moral, social, and biological entities we are, we are worthy of respect
and dignity, including limited sanctuary from the focused attention of others.
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C. Disrespect, Insult, and the Value of Privacy
A common theme in the privacy literature is that the normative virtues of
privacy can be articulated in terms of the backward-looking values of respect for
persons and human dignity. I want to exploit this insight by focusing on those
cases where our privacy has been violated, and try to understand the moral
attitudes of victims of illegitimate focused attention by others. They were not
accorded the respect that our culture demands for any human being.

They

were, I suggest, insulted in a fundamental way that strikes at the heart of
human dignity.
Understanding privacy violations in terms of disrespect, insult, and the
denial of basic dignity allows us to explain an number of puzzling features of
personal privacy. There are a range of different ways in which on can be the
victim of illegitimate focused attention by others, and yet not suffer tangible
economic or psychological damage. One way is to be indifferent to the insult.
My students may call me old fashioned and inflexible, intending it as an insult.
But I may react with amusement, even pride. My local supermarket probably
focuses illegitimate attention on my grocery and liquor purchases by requiring
the scanning of my "club card" in order to receive discounts. In the right frame
of mind, I could take great offense at this. But as a matter of fact, I just don't
care that much. We are puzzled, even troubled, by victims of physical assault
who don't defend their rights. But we admire individuals who can laugh off the
casual insults of their neighbors or fellow drivers. I'm not suggesting that we
should either be troubled by victims of illegitimate focused attention of others
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who do not take offense, or that we should admire them.

We shouldn't be

surprised, however, that there will be some real variance in the individual
sensitivity to, and tolerance of, privacy violations.
A second way that individuals can escape tangible loss when their privacy
is violated is to be blind to the illegitimate focused attention.

Perhaps my

colleagues continually insult me behind my back, but I am neither angered or
saddened because I never find out. One's privacy can egregiously be violated,
yet suffer no pain or embarrassment, because of blissful ignorance. Most of us
have a strong intuition, however, that regardless of the absence of pain, selfconsciousness, or personal or professional disadvantage, victims of unknowing
privacy violations have been wronged just the same.
But respect for persons will sustain an objection even
to secret watching, which may do no actual harm at
all.
Covert observation-spying-is objectionable
because it deliberately deceives a person about his
world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his
reasons, his attempts to make a rational choice. . . .
C is unaware of A. . . . the significance to him of
his enterprise, assumed unobserved, is deliberately
falsified by A. He may be in a fool's paradise or a
fool's hell; either way A is making a fool of him.69
The disrespect hypothesis also beautifully accounts for the clear cultural
component of personal privacy. What actions, gestures, and words, constitute
an insult is clearly a matter of convention. This in no way softens the pain, or
the moral importance, of the insult. One can easily imagine a culture where
raising the middle finger is understood to communicate - "You're number one,
you're the best." Not in our culture, however. The areas of our lives where we
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expect immunity from the focused attention of others is no cultural, or biological,
universal. But given a particular culture where these expected areas of immunity
exist, it is easy to see why the failure to honor this immunity counts as an attack
on the victim's moral core.
Finally, understanding privacy violations as egregious instances of
disrespect that strike at the core of an individual's basic dignity allows us to see
these insults can be so offensive, even though the person loses little.

The

legislators in the state of Oregon a few years back floated the idea of requiring
all state employees, including university professors, to submit to random drug
tests as a condition of employment. Now, no doubt, some of my colleagues had
something to hide. Their lifestyles were potentially threatened. Their loss of
privacy was going to result in a quite tangible personal loss, their job, or their
chosen form of recreation. For most of us on the faculty, however, the days
were long since past when drug tests would disclose anything incriminating.
Nevertheless, we all felt profoundly offended by the proposed policy. How dare
the state, our bosses, put us in a position of having to prove our innocence. We
felt that the contents of our bodily fluids was an extremely intimate area of our
persons where we were entitled to immunity from the focused attention of
others. Most of us were troubled by this misguided potential policy, not because
we had something to hide, but precisely because we were honest, hard-working,
state employees, who felt that our employers owed us trust and respect.
To violate a person's privacy, to illegitimately focus attention on protected
areas of their lives, is to show them great personal disrespect. It is to insult
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them, and in extreme cases, to subject them to a form of assault.

These

violations often produce great personal pain. But it is not the pain that makes
them wrong from the backward looking perspective. It is rather that because
the violations are so clearly wrong, the victims often feel pain.

Privacy

conventions establish a kind of trust between people. Failing to respect these
conventions is, therefore, a breaking of trust - a kind of cheating. The voyeur,
the paparazzi, the causal snoop, and the unscrupulous legal official, are engaged
in an offensive form of injustice. The rules exist, others play by them, and they
have taken advantage of the rules for their own benefit, but have ignored them
as applied to others.

Like all forms of moral offense, the backward looking

perspective seeks some way of redressing this past injustice. The sad truth is, of
course, that contemporary American law's means of addressing these past
violations of personal privacy - jail, civil damages, the exclusionary rule, etc. are all imperfect devices of rectifying the insult and assault that victims have
experienced.
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